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decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to unite

the. law and equity procedures in the federal district courts, pursuant to authority granted by a recent congressional act, is an
event of historic significance for its effect both on law administration in
our national judicial system and as an example for other systems., When
the new procedure is made effective by rules now being formulated, it will
bring about more extensive changes in the federal practice than any that
have occurred since the First Judiciary Act of T789. Obviously not all
the consequences can now be foreseen, but with care and study the difficulties of the transition can be minimized and a flexible practice developed
which will reflect the best of the English and state codes and rules. The
chief problems involved in a complete union of law and equity concern
the preservation of the jury trial right as required by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. It is believed, however, as discussed elsewhere,
that a simple and effective system is possible by requiring the claim of
the right to be made at an early stage of the proceedings in each case or
otherwise to be considered waived. 2 A similar problem, although perhaps
not of quite the same permeating importance, is that of the manner of
appeal and the extent of review to be accorded by the court of review.
Traditionally, and for historical reasons, the equity review is a re-examination of the entire record, on both the facts and the law, while that at law
is limited to a consideration of the legal errors which may have been committed by the trial court. If this difference on appeal is to be continued
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even after a formally united procedure is adopted, it means that the
ancient and troublesome distinctions between law and equity, though
supposedly abolished in the trial court, are yet to be preserved for purposes of appeal. It has seemed clear, therefore, that some change in those
rules is necessary, and the conclusion to that effect by the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, appointed by the Court to assist
it in the preparation of rules of practice, seems to have met with general
approval.3
If revision is to be had, there are two practicable possibilities, each of
which has persuasive arguments in its support and as to the relative
merits of which the bar as a whole seems quite divided. The first is that
the complete review of equity be extended to include all cases tried without a jury-the constitutional provisions as to the jury preventing its
extension to jury trials. This is the plan tentatively adopted and approved by a majority of the Advisory Committee in Rule 68 of its Preliminary Draft. 4 It has the advantages of according the parties a reexamination of the case by at least one more court and of avoiding the
somewhat arbitrary distinction between law and facts, though it does continue differences in review. The other plan is that of extending the law
review to all cases. This achieves complete uniformity of review; it is
also identical with review in other forms of litigation of great importance
in the federal system, notably claims against the government and appeals
from administrative rulings. It does continue the distinction between
law and fact which the Seventh Amendment makes necessary for jury
cases; but it also discourages and limits appeals. 5
3 See Note to Rule 68, Preliminary Draft, at pp. 118-21. The comments received by the
Committee in response to its invitation to the profession apparently show no dissent from
this conclusion; the division of views occurs as to the suggested changes. See note 5 infra.
The power of the Court to adopt a rule on this topic is not discussed herein; it is assumed and
believed that it has such power. For discussion of this point, see Clark, Power of the Supreme
Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1303 (x936).
4 Op. cit. supranote 3. The rule after requiring the trial court in all actions tried without
a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon" continues: "The findings of the court in such cases shall have the same effect as that heretofore
given to findings in suits in equity." For the provision of the Seventh Amendment expressly
preventing its extension to jury trials, see text and note ii infra.
s Comments from the bar on Rule 68 indicate a sharp division of opinion as to these plans.
For able support of the rule, see Professor W. W. Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases,
20 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 68 (1936); for like support of the other alternative see Judge W. Calvin
Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533, 540
(1936). Representatives of the government have pointed out the desirable identity of this
form of review with review of administrative and claims appeals; the law on these points is
ably set forth in an earlier monograph by Helen R. Carloss, special assistant to the Attorney
General, in Monograph on Findings of Fact, printed by the government in 1934.
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The primary purpose of this article is to set forth the background of
the problem in the history of the federal courts and the attitudes of the
various states in the hope that this may be of assistance in the formulation of a judgment as to the proper rule. To this end our own conclusion
may not be of importance. It has seemed desirable, however, to express
it, together with some expansion of the arguments for it, in order to disclose whatever bias may have influenced our exposition, and possibly
to add a little to the clarification of the problem. Accordingly with some
hesitation and with deference particularly to the members of the Committee with whom we have had the honor of collaborating in the enjoyable task of preparing the proposed new federal rules, we have expressed
reasons why we believe the second plan is to be preferred. It is a pleasure
to examine this concrete procedural issue not only because of its importance, but also as a slight tribute to the memory of that wise and knowing
master of pleading, Professor Edward W. Hinton. We have some hope
that our exposition as well as our argument would not seem inconsistent
with his shrewd appraisal of pleading realities.

I
The struggle for a single standard of review is not a new battle. It has
waged since the beginnings of our Constitution, when the framers of that
document provided that the "supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make."'6 This was construed by the
opponents of the new Constitution as a provision which took away from
the citizen his right to a jury trial, and set the verdict of the jury at naught
7
in the hands of an unfriendly and as yet unconstituted federal court.
Luther Martin, Esq., in his report of the Secret Proceedings of the
Federal Convention to the Legislature of Maryland, was most violent in
his condemnation of the appellate jurisdiction and the method of review
proposed to be given to the Supreme Court under the new Constitution.8
So great was the fear of any semblance of arbitrary power in the hands
of the central government that men turned to the jury as the very symbof
of their freedom from autocratic power.
6 Constitution of the United States of America, Art. III, § 2 (2) (italics added).
7 Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Federal Convention 8o-8i (1787); Letter of
Fabius in 1788 on the Federal Constitution, written by John Dickinson; Pamphlet of Elbridge
Gerry published in Boston, 1788; Richard Henry Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer to a Republican, New York, October 12, 1787; George Mason, Objections Addressed to the Citizens of
Virginia; John Winthrop, Essays of Agrippa, Massachusetts Gazette, December ii, 1787.
8 Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Federal Convention 79 (1787).
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The fight thus centered about the right to trial by jury. Hamilton, in
some of the later papers in the Federalist series, 9 pointed out the great
difficulty of drawing a constitutional provision which would attempt to
limit and preserve the right of trial by jury, because of the various practices of the states in this regard: some of the states tried all cases to a
jury; others attempted a dichotomy on the ground of equity and law;
still others made no distinction except that of the convenience to the
court. He concluded that the safest way would be to declare generally
that the Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and fact, and that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions
and regulations as the national legislature may prescribe to answer the
ends of public justice and security.
Hamilton consistently maintained that no such provision as that of
the Seventh Amendment was necessary to protect the right of trial by
jury, but he recognized that one of the great obstacles in the path of the
adoption of the Constitution was this uncertainty as to the effect of the
Constitution upon the right to jury trial. He wrote:
The friends and adversaries of the Convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur
at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury: or if there is any difference between them, it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty,
the latter represent it as the very palladium of full government."
The outcome of the struggle, as everyone knows, was the adoption of
the Constitution with the added protection of the Seventh Amendment.
The latter, in addition to preserving the right of trial by jury, provided
that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court
of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.""
The status of the review in chancery cases in the federal courts was
settled by the First Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, which provided that final decrees and judgments in civil actions, and suits in equity
in a circuit court, brought there by original process, or removed there
from the courts of the several states, or removed there by appeal from a
district court, when the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or value of
two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, might be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court upon a writ of error."1 When the
9The Federalist, No. lxxxi, July 4, 8, 1788.
"0The Federalist, No. lxxxiii, July iS,18, 22, 25, 1788. See also an address by James Wilson, later a justice of the Supreme Court, delivered in Philadelphia on October 6, 1787, where
he set forth the same thesis as that of Hamilton.
11Adopted in 1789 as one of the first ten amendments or bill of rights attached to the Constitution of the United States.
-Sec. 22, c. 20, 1 Stat. 84 (,789).
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Supreme Court reversed a judgment or decree, it was to proceed to render
such judgment or pass such decree as the lower court should have rendered
or passed, except that when the reversal was in favor of the plaintiff or
petitioner in the original suit, and the damages to be assessed, or matter to be decreed were uncertain, the court was to remand the case for a
final decision. It was further provided that in no case removed on writ of
error should the Supreme Court issue execution, but it should send a
special mandate to the circuit court to award execution thereon. 3 At the
same time, it was also provided that the mode of proof by oral testimony
and examination of witnesses in open court should be the same in the
trial of causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as of
4
actions at common law.'
This latter provision was bitterly opposed by the chancery party of
the legislature, since it was considered to be an attempt "to try facts on
civil law principles, without the aid of a jury" and struck at the timehonored practice of chancery of the use of depositions instead of the
testimony of witnesses'in open court. It was a victory for the so-called
anti-chancery party. 15
The career of the single method of review at law and equity prescribed
by the Judiciary Act of 1789 was not a smooth one. There were scattered objections to the imposition of the common law theories of review
upon the chancery and admiralty causes. 6 The attack of the chancery
lawyers upon the system arose from a justifiable pride in the integrity of
their own system, goaded on by the ancient rivalry between the two systems of courts, and certain inconveniences which arose from the prescriptions as to the mode of trial. 17 The admiralty lawyers were concerned
more with the necessity of adapting the decisions of the courts to the needs
and position of a new nation at odds with many powerful foreign powers,
Sec. 24, C. 20, 3 Stat. 85 (1789).
'4 Sec. 30, C. 20, i Stat. 88 (1789).
is See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
Harv. L. Rev. 49 (1923).
,6 Charles Warren in his treatise on The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. I,
at 104 (1922), quotes Attorney General Randolph as saying that "the Premier (Jay) aimed at
the cultivation of Southern popularity; that the Professor (Wilson) knows not an iota of
equity; that the North Carolinian (Iredell) repented of the first ebullitions of a warm temper;
and that it will take a score of years to settle, with such a mixture of Judges, a regular course
of chancery."
,7 In 1792 at the request of the attorney general, the Supreme Court set out the rule of
practice that "The Court considers the practice of the courts of King's Bench and Chancery
in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from time
to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances may render necessary." 2 Dall.
(U.S.) 413-14 (1792).
'3
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an adaptation which was not always readily available in the courts of
first instance.' 8
The argument sprang into full flower in the case of Wiscart v. D'A uicy
in 1796.19 The question before the court was whether a statement of
facts 2° by the circuit court was conclusive in all cases. Chief Justice Ellsworth gave the opinion of the court, stating that even where causes are
removed by writ of error with a statement of the facts and also with the
evidence, the statement of facts was conclusive as to all the facts contained in it. Mr. Justice Wilson, dissenting from the opinion of the
court, 2' was of the opinion that although the Judiciary Act had provided
that all cases should be brought up by writ of error this was a mere
restriction upon appeal and not a prohibition of the use of appeal for the
review of causes in equity and admiralty. The chief justice states clearly
his position thus:
If, however, the construction, that a statement of facts by the circuit court is conclusive, would amount to a denial of justice, would be oppressively injurious to individuals, or would be productive of any general mischief, I should then be disposed to
resort to any other rational exposition of the law, which would not be attended with
these deprecated consequences. But surely it cannot be deemed a denial of justice
that a man shall not be permitted to try his case two or three times over. If he has an
opportunity for the trial of all the parts of his case, justice is satisfied; and even if the
decision of the circuit court had been made final, no denial of justice could be imputed
to our Government; much less can the imputation be fairly made, because the law
directs that in cases of appeals, part shall be decided by one tribunal, and part by
another; the facts by the court below and the law by this court. Such a distribution
of jurisdiction has long been established in England.22
This decision was followed in the later case of Jenningsv. The Brig Perseverance,2 3 where, because of the death of the district judge below, the
record of evidence was sent to the Supreme Court without a statement of
18See Mr. Justice Wilson's dissenting opinion in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 32o,
327 (796); and Blume, op. cit. supranotes. See also the full account of this history in Frank-

furter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 26-35 (i93o), discussed infra this article.
193 Dall. (U.S.) 320, 327 (796).
20 This statement of facts had been provided for by § 19, C. 20, of the Act of September 24,
1789, 1 Stat. 83 which provided: "That it shall be the duty of circuit courts, in causes in
equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to cause the facts on which they found
their sentence or decree, fully to appear upon the record either from the pleadings and decree
itself, or a state of the case agreed by the parties, or their counsel, or if they disagree, by a
stating of the case by the court." This section was altered by the Act of March 3, 1803, § 2,
c. 40, 2 Stat. 244 which provided for appeals in these cases on the evidence and papers.
21 The vote on the proposition was two to four. See 3 Dall. (U.S.) 337 (796).
- Id. at

328-29.

23

3 Dall. (U.S.) 336 (1797).
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the facts, and the Supreme Court refused to consider the evidence of the
facts and affirmed the decree.
Chief Justice Ellsworth resigned in i8oo owing to ill health. The election of 18oo had resulted in the overthrow of the Federalist party, and
the Anti-Federalists with their pronounced animosity to the federal judiciary entered into power. 24 It was not unexpected that they would attempt to give vent to their continued opposition to the interpretation
which the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Ellsworth had made as to
its power. Nor was it unexpected that the new legislature should turn to
the complaints of the chancery lawyers against the imposition upon them
of the common law procedure.
The first lasting fruit of this new victory came in 18o2 when Congress
provided that on the request of either party in an equity cause the court
might in its discretion order the testimony of witnesses therein to be taken
by depositions. 25 Thus the first reform of those who had favored the
joined procedure was invaded. The second step came in the following
year when Congress provided that appeals should be allowed in equity
and admiralty cases, and abolished writs of error in these cases.

6

Thus

was brought back into the federal courts the dual method of review on
appeals and writs of error, and the basis of the distinction was made not
the convenience of the court, but the ancestry of the writ, that is, whether
it derived from Lord Coke or Lord Ellesmere.
II
When Ellsworth resigned as chief justice, the Federalists desired the
appointment of Mr. Justice Paterson to succeed him.27 President Adams.
however, first turned to Jay, the former chief justice, who refused the
appointment on the grounds of the onerous duties imposed upon the
judges by the "circuit riding."2s Then the President named John Mar24See Warren, op. cit. supra note 16, at 68.
2sAct of April 29, 1802, § 25, c. 31, 2 Stat. 156,

66.

21A short-lived Act of February x3, iSor, had provided that an appeal would lie from all
final judgments or decrees in any circuit court, in cases of equity, admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize (§ 33, c. 4, 2 Stat. 89). But this Act was repealed by the
Act of March 8, 1802 (c. 8, 2 Stat. 132), and the former statutes restored. These provisions
were, however, substantially restored by the Act of March 3, 18o3 (c. 40, 2 Stat. 244); The
San Pedro, 2 Wheat. (U.S.) 132 (i857). The necessity of this restoration appeared with the
decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Hooe, i Cranch (U.S.) 3x8 (1803), where the government's writ of error was dismissed for lack of a statement of fact as required by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, § 19.
8
27Warren, op. cit. supra note i6, at 174-76.
2 Id. at 173.
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shall, who, in the teeth of strong Federalist opposition, was affirmed as
the new chief justice.
An attempt in i8oi to provide by statute for appeals as well as writs
of error from the district courts to the circuit courts and thence to the
Supreme Court was repealed in the following year, perhaps inadvertently,
perhaps deliberately29 At any rate, appeals were restored by an act in
18o3 in suits in equity, admiralty and maritime practice, and it was provided that a transcript of the bill, libel, answer, depositions, and all other
proceedings of any kind whatever should be transmitted to the Supreme
30
Court on such appeal.
The fear of the Anti-Federalists that the Federalists would attempt to
superimpose a strange and foreign network of practice upon the state
courts, and so gradually encroach upon the familiar practices of the
several states, finds its expression in the statutes of this period. The tendency of the legislators is dearly that of adapting the federal practice to
that of the states in conformity in all possible instances, and of providing
3
limits for the jurisdiction of the federal courts. '
From i8oo to x865 there were no further successful attempts at establishing a joined system of review in law and equity cases. This is the
period in which the two systems of review go their own ways, each with
its own rules of procedure, with the rift widening between the review
of actions at law and suits in equity.
In 1865, however, the problem arose in the enactments of that year
concerning the waiver of jury trial in civil actions, and the provision for
the trial of both questions of fact and of law by the trial court sitting
without a jury. 32 Here, then, we have moved forward to a changed con29See note 26 supra.
30 Ibid.
31 For example, see the Act of May 13, i8oo (c. LXI, 2 Stat. 82), where the legislature was
providing for the designation of jurors in the courts of the United States, and, perhaps mindful of the storm of protest raised against the Constitution on the ground that it did not adequately preserve the right to jury trial, it provided that such jurors should be chosen by lot
in each district or state, as nearly as possible in the same manner, as they were chosen in that
state. The Act of July 20, x840 (c. XLVII, 5 Stat. 394), went further in allowing the federal
courts to make rules or orders from time to time, conforming their practice to any change
hereafter adopted by the legislatures of the several states. The statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts are very numerous in this period, and it is not necessary to cite
them in this place. See Clark and Moore, op. cit. supranote 2, at 387 ff.
32 Act of March 3, i865, § 4, c. 86, 13 Stat. 501, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 773, 875 (1928),
which
provided that "issues of fact in civil cases in any district court may be tried and determined
by the court, without the intervention of a jury, whenever the parties, or their attorneys of
record, file with the clerk a stipulation in writing waiving a jury. The finding of the court
upon the facts, which may be either general or special, shall have the same effect as the verdict
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cept. The action is one at law. It is tried as to its facts not by the timehonored practice of a jury, but it is tried to the court alone. There is no
question of the judge's charging himself as to the law which he must consider in his finding of the facts. From the standpoint of the origin of the
action, it is like a law case, and should be reviewed by a writ of error, but
there is here no question of a jury trial involved, no sacred right to trial
by jury to be preserved inviolate. From the actual physical set-up of the
trial it is like an equity case, since it is tried to the judge alone, who finds
both the facts and the law.
The Act of March 3, 1865, in providing for this class of cases, sets forth
that the finding of the court upon the facts, which may be either general
or special, shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury. 33 On review
of these cases, the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial, if excepted to at the time, and duly presented by a bill of exceptions, may be
reviewed upon a writ of error or upon appeal; and when the finding is
special, the review may extend to the determination of the sufficiency of
4
the facts found to support the judgment3
These enactments take the position, therefore, that in all cases at law,
where a jury trial might be claimed, whether the trial is had to a jury or
to the court alone sitting without a jury, the review of such cases shall be
the same, viz., according to the rules of the common law. The statutes
were early interpreted to have been passed to preserve to the parties
submitting a cause to a trial before the court, both as to law and fact,
the benefit of a review or re-examination of questions of law in the appellate court, as theretofore obtained only in cases in which the facts were
found by a jury or were admitted by the parties upon a case stated and
submitted upon the questions of law. 3s Further it was held that by this
statute the facts as found and stated by the court below are conclusive
on review, and that the review of cases with special findings extends only
to a determination of whether the facts as found are sufficient to support
the judgment,36 but not as to whether the findings are supported by the
37
weight of the evidence.
Thus was more firmly cut the line of demarcation between the two
of a jury." This was followed by the provisions as to review and that the review of special
findings might "extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the facts found to support
the judgment," as stated below in the text.
33Id. at § 773.
35 Flanders
36 Boogher
37

34 Id. at § 875.

v. Tweed, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 425 (1870).
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 103 U.S. 90, 97 (188o).

Dooley v. Pease, i8o U.S. 126 (igoi). See note go infra.
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types of review, not on grounds of convenience, nor yet on the ground of
the presence or absence of a jury trial, but on the inherent difference between actions at law and suits in equity. This was further evidenced by
the attitude of the courts toward the use of juries in equity causes, such as
patent suits, where the courts were unwilling to grant that the presence
of a jury in such a suit rendered the review of the judgment on the verdict
38
that of actions at law.
These enactments of 1865 and their resultant interpretations must be
construed as a victory of the common law over its rivals and an extension
of its jurisdiction and procedural review even over those cases where the
jury was not present.3 9
III
We now come to the period in the history of the federal courts when
two important trends, exercising increasing force, converged to bring us
to our present problem. The first is the development of code pleading
38 28 U.S.C.A. § 772 (1928); Act of February i6, '875, § 2, C. 77, i8 Stat. 316. See also
case of Watt v. Starke, I1or U.S. 247 (i88o).
39 Professor Blume in his article, loc. cit. supra note 5, at 70, objects to the common law
review in jury-waived cases on this ground: "As in jury cases, a motion for new trial may be
made on the ground that findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence, but this motion
must be addressed to the judge who made the findings and his decision on the motion is
final." This objection is more properly addressed to the rule that decisions on motions for new
trial are not reviewable in the appellate court except for abuse of discretion. Ralston Purina
Co. v. Bansau, 73 F. (2d) 430, 431 (C.C.A. 7th 1934); Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co. v. Kelly,
74 F. (2d) 3i (C.C.A. 8th 1934). Of course the appellate court, as well as the trial court in
actions at law, whether a jury trial has been waived or not, can grant a new trial, as was done
in the case of Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 425 (1870). The same strict limitation on
review of the judge's decision on a motion for a new trial is conventionally stated in state
practice, although abuse of discretion is apparently discoverable from the state of the evidence, particularly where the trial court has upset a jury verdict. Cf. La Fayette Fire Ins.
Co. v. Camnitz, iii Fla. 556, 149 So. 653 (1934); Hart v. Stence, 219 Iowa 55, 257 N.W. 434
(1934); Grigsby v. Grigsby, 249 Ky. 727, 6i S.W. (2d) 6o5 (1933); Bumgaruer v. Ekstrum,
228 Mo. App. 424, 67 S.W. (2d) 520 (1934). See also 2 Graham and Waterman, New Trials
43 ff. (i855); Hinton, Power of Federal Appellate Court to Review Ruling on Motion for
New Trial, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1i1, X13 (1933); i9 A.L.R. 744 (1922); 24 A.L.R. 1267
(1923); 33 A.L.R. 10 (1924).
Professor Blume has recently amplified his views with an interesting argument that more
extensive review of facts in jury cases is really permitted under the Seventh Amendment.
Blume, Review of Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Amendment, 20 J. Am. Jud. Soc. i3o
(Dec. 1936). As pointed out below in this article, we are in accord with him in believing that
the rule of review at law should be made more flexible, but, as we state, it is believed that the
way to achieve that result is to make such review applicable to all cases. In view of the express
wording of the Seventh Amendment (note ii supra), it is obviously out of the question to
apply the equity rule in terms to cases tried by jury. To announce two separate and conflicting rules for jury and jury-waived cases would seem to be a way of emphasizing the gap
between them, rather than dosing it.
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in this country, which emphasized the union of law and equity and
brought about a decline of the procedural distinctions between the two
systems, a decline extending even to the non-code states. The second
is the pressure of business upon the federal judicial system with the
growth of the country and the complexity of the problems presented to
the national courts for solution, making it necessary that their jurisdiction, particularly the jurisdiction on review, should be sharply curtailed.
The code movement in this country began, as is well known, with the
adoption of the Field Code in the State of New York in 1848.40 The
response in the other states was literally amazing in the light of the general slow movement of judicial reform.41 It had more extensive effects,
too, than in this country alone, for the sweeping changes of the Judicature Act in England in 1873 and later in the English colonies followed the
same lines. 42 Even yet its force is not exhausted, as witnessed by the
recent revision of practice in Illinois, effective in 1934,43 and by the federal
statute of 1934, authorizing the new rules-a bill long sponsored by the
American Bar Association which, since 1922 and at the behest of Chief
44
It
justice Taft, had included authorization for the united procedure.
had its effect in all the jurisdictions to bring about greater interchange
between equity and law, and at most only five or six states can fairly
be considered now to have a truly divided system. 4 On matters of appeal
the states have been less successful in working out a single system of
review. As pointed out hereinafter, perhaps a third of the strictly code
states have the single review, but in others the rule varies and a considerable amount of the advantage of the union has thus been lost.46 The
40 N.Y.L. 1848, C. 379, § 62, which provided: "The distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing are abolished;
and there shall be in this state hereafter but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil
action." See i Clark, Cases on Pleading and Procedure 502-5 (1930).
41 Clark, Code Pleading 19-22 (1928); Hepburn, The Development of Code Pleading i ff.

(i896).
42 Clark, Code Pleading i4-i7 (1928); Hepburn, The Development of Code Pleading, c. VI
(1896); cf. C. H. S. Fifoot, English Law and Its Background i4-i6 (1932).
43 Illinois C.P.A. effective January i, 1934, Smith Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. 1io; cf.
Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 209 (1933).
44 Act of June ig, 1934, note i supra. For the history of this portion of the act see Clark,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 1304, n. 3.
45 Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 Corn. L. Q. 443 (i935). In
certain of the so-called common law states the procedure is, if anything, moreunited than in
some of the code states; witness Massachusetts, where a case begun in equity can be completed

at law without change or amendment. Adams v. Silverman, 280 Mass. 23,
Callahan v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 286 Mass. 223, i9o N.E. 792 (1934).
46 See pp. 215-16 and note 112 infra.

182

N.E.

I (1932);

REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT

general success of the united practice, the saving of delay and expense
and the avoiding of reversals for technicalities, has made it so popular
that the trend has been all in that direction, a trend which has had its
influence on the federal system.
The first impact of code pleading upon the federal system seems to be
found in the Conformity Act of 1872,47 providing that the federal practice at law should conform as near as may be to that of the state where
the court was held. Prior to that date the federal statutes had required
a static conformity, that is, one to the state practice as of a certain date
(the exact date being changed by successive statutes). The swift spread
of the codes made such a'static conformity worse than useless, for it
might easily require the practice at law to conform to a practice already
outmoded and abolished in the state courts. Consequently the theory of
continuing conformity as of the time of the action was applied in the
Act of 1872 and is still in effect, although a main purpose of the proposed
present revision of the federal procedure is the abolition of conformity
completely.4
Meanwhile the increasing congestion in the federal courts had called
for relief, and one development to this end had been the restriction on the
extent of review to be granted in federal cases. This bit of history has
been so fully developed by Professor Felix Frankfurter that we need do
no more here than summarize his exposition.4 9 In 1875 the arrears in the
business of the Supreme Court led to relief not merely by lifting the level
of the jurisdictional amount, but by restricting review in admiralty cases.
To this end Congress restored the provisions of the First Judiciary Act
limiting admiralty review to a determination of questions of law arising
upon the record,So and, as Professor Frankfurter puts it, "in language
reminiscent of Ellsworth's, Chief Justice Waite, for the Court, carried out
the remedial purpose of the Act."' S At about this time Attorney-General
Garland was urging upon Congress the extension of the principles of the
47 17 Stat. I96 (1872), 28 U.S.C.A. § 724 (1928).
48 For the history leading up and subsequent to the Conformity Act and the objections to
it, see Clark and Moore, op. cit. supra note 2, at 387 ff.; also Clark, op. cit. supranote 45.
49 Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note i8, at 26-35. In view of the full citations
of authorities given by Professor Frankfurter, supporting citations are here reduced to a
minimum. For an able discussion of the congestion in the federal courts in this country, see
Budd, The United States Court of Appeals, 9 Law Q. Rev. 5i (1893); and cf. also Frankfurter
and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1927), especially c. II.
sOAct of February 16, 1875, § xi,
x8 Stat. 315.
s'In The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 44o, 445 (1878). See Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 18, at
29. The reference isto Ellsworth's opinion in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 320 (796).
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Act of 1875 to appellate review in equity cases. 2 Meanwhile the Act of
1865, referred to above, s3 had made clear the limitations on review in
federal actions at law, and the Supreme Court, by rule originally adopted
in 1865 and still followed,5 4 had required the court of claims to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law, thus limiting review to questions
of law, with the findings of fact treated like a special verdict 5 A corresponding requirement of findings was made for the district courts when
acting upon claims against the United States under the provision of the
Tucker Act in concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims,56 and review of its findings is limited to questions of law.S7 Another important
similar development was the Act of 1874 concerning the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the judgment and decrees of territorial courts, which required that on appeal, instead of the evidence at
large, a statement of the facts of the case in the nature of a special verdict
should be reported~5 Under this act review in the Supreme Court of the
decisions of the territorial supreme courts was restricted to questions of
law, independently of whether the territory had or had not abolished the
distinction between law and equity.s 9
Whether these several developments might have led to a restriction of
the equity rule of review as urged by Attorney-General Garland is an
52

Rep. Att'y-Gen'l r885,

42;

id. i886, i8; id. 1887, xv; id. 1888, xiv, as cited in Frank-

furter and Landis, op. cit. supranote i8, at 3o.
5 Notes 33 and 34 supra.
54 Rule 1, 3 Wall. (U.S.) vii (1865), amended in x7 Wall. (U.S.) xvii (1873). See Revised
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States 1936, rules 4o and 41; subdivision 3 of the
latter providing that the special finding shall be in the nature of a special verdict. Since the
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, § 3(a) and 3(b), c. 229, 43 Stat. 939, review by the Supreme Court of
the judgment of the court of claims, except for questions certified by the latter court, has been
on certiorari only. Cf. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 346, 347 (1928); for review by the circuit court of
appeals, see Act of Feb. 13, 1925, § 4, c. 229, 43 Stat. 939, 28 U.S.C.A. § 226 (X928).
s5The cases are very numerous. Among more recent cases see Portsmouth Harbor, Land
and Hotel Co. v. U.S., 260 U.S. 327 (1922); Stilz v. U.S., 269 U.S. i44 (1925); Rogers v. U.S.,
270 U.S. 154 (1926); Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. U.S., 272 U.S. 533 (1926); U.S. v. Wells,
283 U.S. 102 (193i); see also Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note i8, at 32. This has been true, also,

in cases sounding in equity or admiralty, notwithstanding the former difference in manner of

appeal. Chase v. U.S., 155 U.S. 489 (1894); Brown's Guide to Federal and Bankruptcy Practice 5oo (1933).
s6 Under what is now 28 U.S.C.A. § 41, subdiv. 20 (1928); the provision as to findings, now
28 U.S.C.A. § 764 (1928), was originally in Act of March 3, i887, § 7, 24 Stat. 505, 5o6.
S Wessel v. U.S., 49 F. (2d) 137 (C.C.A. 8th 1931); Lee Hardware Co. v. U.S., 25 F. (2d)
42 (C.C.A. 8th 1928); Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note i8, at 32.
sSAct of April 7, 1874, § 2, iS Stat. 27.
59Full citations are given by Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note i8, at 33, 34,

pointing out also certain recent exceptions under special acts.
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interesting question. Instead, relief came of a different sort. In 1891
Congress created the circuit court of appeals and thus effectively lifted
the pressure from the Supreme Court. No provision was made for findings by the district court as a foundation of appeal to the circuit court
of appeals or by the latter as a basis of review on certiorari, and the practice returned again to a review of the entire record in admiralty as well as
equity causes.6 ° In 193o, however, as we shall point out later, the Supreme
Court by amendment of the equity rules restored the provision in equity
and admiralty requiring separate findings of facts and conclusions of law
to be stated, and thus, as Professor Frankfurter points out, it "has restored in substance the provisions made for it by Congress in i789."61
Meanwhile a direct approach to the code union was being made in the
federal courts. The first step was in the Federal Equity Rules of 1912,
providing for free transfer of equity causes to the law side of the court,
and this was supplemented by the Law and Equity Act of 1915, providing
for the filing of equitable defenses in actions at law and for the transfer of
law cases to the equity calendar. 62 As a result of these legislative and judicial steps and the construction given them by the Court, a substantial
union of law and equity has already been achieved in the federal courts,
leaving, however, formal vestiges of the ancient practice to raise troublesome, technical questions and without changing the divided form of
review13
Moreover, the Equity Rules of 1912 restored the former provision of
the First Judiciary Act of 1789 that the testimony of witnesses in all
trials in equity shall be taken in open court, except in certain limited
i8,at 30, 31.
and Landis, op. cit. supra note i8, at 32. Professor Frankfurter re-emphasizes his position by the following statement (p. 32, n. 58): "Under the new rules review in
equity and admiralty will, as in common law actions, in effect be restricted to questions of
law, thus restoring the practice of 1789, but the review, instead of being entitled 'by writ of
error' as in 1789, is now called 'appeal.' " Compare Professor Blume's criticism of the requirement of Rule 68 for special findings as "worse than useless" when full review is had. Op. it.
supra note 5, at 73. Messrs. Frankfurter and Landis had previously advocated limitation of
review in the Supreme Court to "the theory upon which review of decisions of the Court of
Claims, as well as review of common law actions without a jury, has already been based."
Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note 49, at 290-92; and see also the same authors' The
Supreme Court under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 Iarv. L. Rev. i, 23 (1928); cf. Griswold
and Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity Appeals, 42 Harv.L. Rev. 483, 501
60Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note
61 Frankfurter

(I929).
6Equity Rules 1912, Nos. 22, 23; March 3, 1915, c. 90, 38 Stat. 956, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 397,
398 (1926), Jud. Code §§ 274a, 274b; Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U.S. 235,
L. Rev. 535 (1935), commenting upon Joyce v. Humbird, 78 F. (2d)
241 (1922); cf. 30 Ill.
386 (C.C.A. 7th 1935).
63 Clark and Moore, op. cit. supra note 2, at 387 ff.; Clark, op. cit. supranote 45.
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cases, and that the court shall pass upon the admissibility of all evidence
offered as in actions at law. 4 This represented a clear and unmistakable
adjustment of the procedure in equity to that at law, and the removal
of one of the most important arguments for the separate scope of review in
equity. Heretofore, the fact that in equity cases the usual method of
taking testimony had been by deposition, which being in written form
could be examined by the appellate court as fairly and easily as by the
trial court, had been at the base of the contention that in equity suits the
review should proceed as a rehearing upon the written documents, since it
did not involve questions as to the credibility or behavior under examina6s
tion of witnesses.
In 1928 an attempt was made to abolish the writ of error in cases,
civil and criminal, and substitute appeal in its place.66 The motives behind this enactment were a desire to simplify and make more easy the
procedure by which the review of an action could be obtained. 67 The procedure for taking an appeal was free from many of the technicalities
which accompanied the old procedure for obtaining a writ of error, and
the change was to effect merely a less complicated procedure for taking an
appeal, and was not to affect the scope of the review which was to be had
6
in an action. But so great was the outcry from bench and bar alike,
which interpreted the reform to be a substitution of the equity review
for that at law, that the further Act of April 26, 1928, was immediately
passed, which emasculated the proposed reform into a mere change of
words by providing that the statutes regulating the right to a writ of
error, defining the relief which may be had thereon, and prescribing the
6

4Federal Equity Rule 46, superseding old rule 67. See compiler's note to the new rule in
28 U.S.C.A. following § 723 at p. 309 (1928). Former rule 67 had provided as a departure from
the usual practice that "upon due notice given as prescribed by previous order, the court may,
in its discretion, permit the whole, or any specific part, of the evidence to be adduced orally
in open court on final hearing." This rule was, however, merely permissive and accomplished
little in the way of reform.
6
s That the reason for the rule of equity was that the evidence in chancery was not oral
but by deposition and should not now apply when the chancellor sees the witnesses, see Dickinson v. Todd, 172 Mass. x83, 51 N.E. 976 (I898), and Old Comer Book Store v. Upham, I94
Mass. ioI, 8o N.E. 228 (1907); and see also American Rotary Valve Co. v. Moorehead, 226
Fed. 202 (C.C.A. 7th 1915), discussing the effect of the equity rules.
6 28 U.S.C.A. § 861a (x936), which provided that "The writ of error in cases, civil and
criminal, is abolished. All relief which heretofore could be obtained by writ of error shall hereafter be obtainable by appeal."
67 For an excellent historical account of the passing of this statute, see Payne, Writs of
Error in the Federal Courts, i Va. L. Rev. 3o5 (1929). See also Frankfurter and Landis,
op. cit. supra note 61, at 27-29; the same authors, The Business of the Supreme Court at
October Term, 1930, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 271 (1931); 41 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1928).
68 See Payne, op. cit. supra note 67.
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mode of exercising that right and of invoking that relief, should be applicable to the appeal substituted for the old writ of error. 69 Thus the old
writ of error now became known as an appeal, but its characteristics remained unchanged otherwise.7o
Beginning in 1930 the Supreme Court placed increasing emphasis upon
the necessity of findings of facts in equity cases, by the adoption of
Equity Rule 7o271 (extended to the court's action in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions by an amendment as recent as November 25,
1935), by which it is required that in deciding suits in equity, including
those required to be heard before three judges, the court of first instance
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and that these findings and conclusions shall be entered of record, and included in the record on appeal. By reason of this rule, and of
the federal statutes regulating the trial of issues of fact to the court in
jury-waived cases, 72 there is required in all cases tried to the court with-

out a jury that findings of facts be made by the trial court and ieturned
to the reviewing court on appeal. The court has shown its intention
to enforce this rule and has emphasized the absolute need thereof as an
73
aid in the sifting out of complex facts from voluminous records.
This trend toward the requirement of special findings is in accord with
the practice in the states. Only two states, Illinois74 and Michigan7 s have
taken a definite step away from the practice of requiring or preferring that
the trial court make findings of fact in cases tried to the court without a
6 28 U.S.C.A. § 861b (1936).
70 See Weinstein v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 31 F. (2d) 519 (C.C.A. 2d 1929).
o
7' This was a new rule promulgated June 2, 1930, to take effect October 1, 193 . The
amendment of 1935 was foreshadowed by Public Service Commission v. Wisconsin Telephone
Co., 289 U.S. 67 (1933); cf. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S.

287, 330 (1933).
72 28 U.S.C.A.

§§ 773, 875 (1928), cited note 32 supra.

73 "Our rules do not permit adequate opportunity for presentation of such cases as upon

trial de novo." Butler, J., dissenting in Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287, 330 (1933). Cf. also Public Service Commission v. Wisconsin Telephone
Co., 289 U.S. 67 (1933). The necessity of reducing the record is stressed by Judge Chesnut,
op. cit. supra note 5, although apparently questioned by Professor Blume, op. cit. supra note 5.
It is also stressed many times by Professor Frankfurter. See Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit.
supranote 49, at 290; Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supranote 18, at 23, 30-35; Frankfurter

and Landis, op. cit. supranote 67, at 278, particularly n. 16, giving some data concerning long
records before the Supreme Court; also Brandeis, J., concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 86 (1936).
74Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. 110, § 64(2).

75Mich. Court Rules 1933, rule 37, § I'. See also Final Report of the Michigan Procedural

Commission, 111-12 (1929), for a presentation of the reasons which led Michigan to abolish
the necessity of special findings.
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jury. Of this attitude, the statute in Illinois affords a fair example. It is
there provided that
no special findings of fact or propositions of law shall be necessary in6 any case at law
tried without a jury to support the judgment or as a basis for review.7
It is to be noted that this provision is limited to cases at law, and that
it is not a statement that no findings may be made, but merely that they
77
are not essential to the support of the judgment or as a basis for review.
The procedure in both of these states is based upon a close following of
the English practice, where the courts are not faced by the problem of
crowded appellate dockets or of voluminous trial records.
In some seven of the states is found no express statutory provision or
court rule regarding the matter of special findings.7 But in the majority
of the states of the union there are found, either in the statutes or in the
court rules, definite provisions for the use and requirement of findings of
fact in ill cases tried to the court without the intervention of a jury,
including both jury-waived and "equity" cases. In some nineteen of
the states, there is a definite requirement that the court in such cases
must make special findings of fact in writing and state them separately from the conclusions of law. 79 These include such states as California,
76Smith-Hurd's

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. 11o, § 64(2).

77 For

example, in the Michigan rule it is stated that "no special findings shall be required,
but it shall be sufficient for the trial judge to find generally for or against the several parties,"
but "the trial judge shall sign and file or dictate to the stenographer, an opinion in which he
shall set forth his decision and the substance of the judgment with a concise statement of his
reasons therefor, and where he awards damages, the manner in which he determined the
amount."
In Illinois, where findings are made, as in Baker v. Himrichs, 359 Il. 138, 194 N.E. 284
(1934), it was held that, in a proceeding to contest an election, the finding of the trial judge
who saw and heard the witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably against
the weight of the evidence; and in Mandel Bros., Inc. v. The Industrial Commission, 359 InI.
405, 194 N.E. 730 (1935), and Stellwagen v. The Industrial Commission, 359 Ill.
557, 195 N.E.
29 (1935), it was held that a finding by the commission upon a contested question of fact will
not be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless the conclusion reached is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence, and where the commission has seen and heard the witnesses,
its finding is entitled to great weight. In Weiniger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584,
i95 N.E. 420 (1935), it was held that where co-partners who have insured their stock of goods
against fire, bring a suit in equity on several policies covering the loss, the finding of the chancellor will not be disturbed on review where it is well within the range of the evidence, and not
against its manifest weight.
78Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia, and West Virginia.
79 Ark.

Civ. Code 1934, § 364; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 1933, §§ 633-634; Colo. Code, § 307

(Courtright-Mills, 1933); Conn. Pr. Bk. 1934, § 232; Idaho Code 1932, §§ 7-302, 7-305;
Mass. Ann. L. 1932, c. 214, § 23; Mdson's Minn. Stat. 1927, § 9311 (supp. 1936); Nev. Comp.
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Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, North
and South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. In some twenty other states it is provided by statute or court rule that the court
may make special findings of fact in such cases, and must do so where
so requested by the parties. ° These states include Alabama, Arizona,
Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming.
With this history we now come to the Act of June i9, 1934, under which
the Supreme Court is proceeding to unite the law and equity procedures
in the federal courts. 8'
IV
Before we attempt a final revaluation of proposed Rule 68 there are
certain other factors which should be noted. The first is the crystallization in the equity courts themselves of principles of review which are selfdenying ordinances, making the equity review in reality not widely different from that at law. The importance of this factor lies in the fact
that, while theoretically the review in cases in equity is that of a rehearing or a trial de novo, there have grown up certain well settled and often
reiterated principles observed by equity courts in the consideration of
findings of facts. The constant application of these principles to cases
on review has resulted in a doctrine which when applied reaches conclusions very closely analogous to those achieved in the review of actions
at law.
One of these principles announced by the courts of equity in the review
of findings of facts is that the findings of the lower court on the facts will
stand in the appellate court unless dearly erroneous, because the trial
L.

1929,

§8783; N. J. Sup. Ct. rule 113

(1929);

N. M. Stat.

1929,

§ 105-813; N. C. Code 1935,

§ 569; N. D. Comp. L. Ann. 1913, §7641; Ore. Code Ann. 1930, § 2-502; 1 S. C. Code 1932,
§ 649; S. D. Comp. L. 1929, §§ 25;5-26; Utah Rev. Stat. 1933, § 104-26-2; Vt. Pub. L. 1933,
§ 2069; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 367 (2 Remington, 1932); Wis. Stats. 1931, § 270.33.
so Ala. Code 1929, § 9500; Ariz. Rev. Code 1928, § 3819; Ind. Ann. Stat., § 603 (Burns,
1926); Iowa Code 1931, § 11435; Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1923, § 6o-2921; Ky. Codes Ann.,
Civil Prac. § 332 (Carroll, 1927); 2 Mo. Stat. Ann. 1932, § 952; Mont. Rev. Code, § 9369
(Choate, 1921); Neb. COmp. Stat. 1929, § 20-1127; N. H. Pub. L. 1926, c. 316, § 12; N. Y.,
Parson's Practice Manual, § 439, 440 (i934); Ohio Gen. Code 1926, § 11470; i Okla. Stats.
1931, §374; Pa. Sup. Ct. Equity Rules, rule 67 (1925); R. I. Gen. L. 1923, C.337, § 6; Tenn.
Code, §881i (6 Williams, 19 34);Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., § 2208 (6 Vernon, X926); Wyo. Rev. Stat.

§ 89-1321. Two doubtful states, whose decisions seem in accord with this practice, are
Florida and Louisiana. The New York Code was amended by L. 1936, c. 915, to make it un1931,

necessary for the judge to pass separately upon the parties' requested findings and to permit
him to incorporate the facts in his decision. See 2d Report, N.Y. Judicial Council, 199-211

(1936).
81Note i supra.
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judge has had the opportunity of seeing and estimating the credibility
of the witnesses, an advantage which is not available to the appellate
court. This is a canon of decision so well accepted that it is scarcely necessary to cite specific instances. 82 Another principle is that where the court
below has considered conflicting evidence, and has made its findings and
decree thereon, they must be taken as presumptively correct, and unless
an obvious error has intervened in the application of the law to the facts,
or some serious mistake has been made in the consideration of the evi5 3
dence, they must be permitted to stand on review.
The reviewing court in equity cases distinguishes between findings
based on conflicting evidence and those based on undisputed evidence,
between those based on oral testimony given in open court and those
based on written documents and depositions, and accords to findings
based on conflicting evidence or oral testimony in open court a high presumption of correctness, which can be rebutted only by a clear showing
84
of obvious error or mistake.
The net result of the application of these principles is that reversals
of equity cases for errors of fact are comparatively rare. A random
sampling of some fifty-five cases between i9oo and 1934 shows only four
reversals after examination of the facts, and these involve such matters
as the ultimate conclusion of fraud or the infringement of copyright
suits, matters, at least under some rulings, to be treated as essentially
82 Even Professor Blume, op. cit. supra note 5,at 71, states that "in literally thousands of
cases courts of the United States have iterated and reiterated the supposed truth that a trial
judge who sees and hears the witnesses is in a better position to determine issues of fact than
an appellate court which gets its impressions from a cold, printed record." He then argues
that this "supposed truth" became accepted before the days of court stenographers and has
persisted in spite of the fact that it is now possible to reproduce the exact words of the witnesses. But the general experience seems to be opposed to Professor Blume's view and more in
accord with that of Judge Chesnut, op. cit. supranote 5,which he criticizes. The universally
approved change from depositions to the taking of direct testimony in equity cases (see notes
64 and 65 sup ra ) witnessed this. Moreover, the appellate equity courts themselves seem to
take another view in their anxiety to obtain a reduction of the records by insulating themselves
against the testimony through the requirements of its reduction to narrative form and of
findings of facts. Cf. supra note 73.
8
s3
See, for example, such cases as Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co.,
104 Fed. 243 (C.C.A. 8th igoo); Lilienthal v. McCormick, 117 Fed. 89 (C.C.A. 9th 1902);
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Consolidated Mining Co., 2o4 Fed. i66 (C.C.A. 8th 1913),
cert. den. 229 U. S.624 (1913); Butte and Superior Copper Co. v. Clark Montana Realty Co.,
248 Fed. 6og (C.C.A. 9th i98), cert. den. 247 U.S. 516 (i918); Unkle v. Wills, 281 Fed. 29
(C.C.A. 8th 1922); Fienup v. Kleinman, 5 F. (2d) 137 (C.C.A. 8th 1925).
84 See Simkins, Federal Practice 799 (x934), and cases therein cited.
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questions of law. Five other cases were reversed on other grounds, while
forty-six were affirmed15
We have seen that in Professor Frankfurter's view the requirement of
special findings of fact in equity cases, emphasized since 1930 by amendment to the equity rules, led automatically to a restriction on the scope
of review.86 This point has not been passed on directly by the Supreme
Court, although decisions of the circuit court of appeals have applied the
former rule of review without apparently contemplating the possibility
that a change had occurred.8 7 Even if Professor Frankfurter is incorrect
in the extent to which the rule goes, it is clear, however, that this requirement will reinforce the presumption which the Court has already applied
in favor of the trial court's action.
It should be noted, also, that the review at law is not wholly inflexible.
In fact, there has already been a modification of the original rules of
35The cases were chosen at random from the citations under notes 1286-89 to the Federal
Equity Rules appearing after 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (1928), but with weighted distribution in the
various circuits comparable to the total number of cases cited in the notes and with representative distribution as to subject matter. The following cases were reversed and remanded
to the lower court on the basis of an examination of the findings: Ridge v. Healy, 25E Fed.
798 (C.C.A. 8th i918) (overreaching by attorney in contract for fee); Kansas City So. Ry.
Co. v. May, 2 F. (2d) 68o (C.C.A. 8th 1924) (fraud); United States v. Mammoth Oil Co.,
14 F. (2d) 705 (C.C.A. 8th 1926) (fraud); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. (2d) i (C.C.A.
9th 933) (infringement of copyright). The following cases were reversed or vacated on other
grounds than error in the finding: Rochester German Ins. Co. of Rochester, N. Y. v. Schmidt,
162 Fed. 447 (C.C.A. 4 th 19o8); Semidey v. Central Aguirre Co., 239 Fed. 61o (C.C.A. ist
1917), cert. den. 243 U.S. 652 (I917); John T. Porter v. Java Cocoanut Oil Co., 4 F. (2d) 476
(C.C.A. 9th 1925), cert. den. 268 U.S. 697 (1925); Carey v. Donohue, 209 Fed. 328 (C.C.A. 6th
1913); Moran v. Morgan, 252 Fed. 719 (C.C.A. 2d 1918). The last two were reversed on the
law as applied to the facts found by the lower court. The other forty-six cases were affirmed,
and the findings of the trial court approved. Since they continuously repeat and apply the
"familiar rule" that the chancellor's findings are "presumptively correct," not to be disturbed
"unless an obvious error has intervened in the application of the law, or some serious mistake
has been made on the consideration of the evidence," citation of all the cases would seem
unnecessary. But it is instructive to note how overwhelmingly numerous the affirmances are
as compared to the reversals. Instructive examples are Blank v. Aronson, 187 Fed. 241 (C.C.A.
8th x911) (from which the quotations are made); U.S. v. U.S. Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32,
41 (i918); American Rotary Valve Co. v. Moorehead, 226 Fed. 202, 203 (C.C.A. 7th 1915);
Schlank v. Smith, 246 Fed. 686 (C.C.A. 8th 1917); Unkle v. Wills, 281 Fed. 29, 34 (C.C.A. 8th
1922); Taylor v. Nevada Humboldt Tungsten Mines Co., 295 Fed. 112, 114 (C.C.A. 9th 1924).
6 Note 6. supra.
8
7Boynton v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 57 F. (2d) 772 (C.C.A. ioth 1932), cert.

den.

287 U.S. 620 (1932); Johnson v. Umsted, 64 F. (2d) 316 (C.C.A. 8th 1933); Hopkins v.
Texas Co., 62 F. (2d) 691 (C.C.A. roth 1933), cert. den. 290 U.S. 629 (i933); cf. also Public
Service Comm. v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 289 U.S. 67 (1933); Los Angeles Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Railroad Comm., 289 U.S. 287 (i933); Martin v. Drexel Ice Cream Co., 8o F. (2d) 768
(C.C.A. 7th 1935).
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review in jury-waived cases, rules which concealed pitfalls for the lawyer
and thus deservedly came into disfavor for reasons other than on the
merits of the issue in which we are interested. It was difficult for counsel
to secure an adequate review of a jury-waived case unless he had taken
the two precautions of making a written waiver and, usually, of requesting
and obtaining special findings. If he went to trial on oral waiver, he was
held to have submitted the case to the judge as an arbitrator; and under
the statute of 1865, as we have seen, it was only where special findings
were had that the review could go to the sufficiency of the facts found
to support the judgment.8 8 In 1930 the jury waiver statute was amended
to include waiver in open court, and the proposed Rule 68 requires special
findings in all cases.5 9 It would seem, therefore, that these technical
difficulties formerly such a trap to the lawyers will be a thing of the past,
and the law review may therefore, on its side, tend to lose some of its
sharper contours. One advantage of a single form of review would be the
bringing to a culmination of these trends towards each other of the two
reviews, while the adoption now of rules re-emphasizing the division might
tend to administer a sharp check to them. Even as it'is, the cases show
that some review of the facts is had in examining the sufficiency of the
facts to sustain the judgment. 9° The tendency is now to incorporate this
88 28 U.S.C.A.

§§

773, 875 (1928), cited notes 32-34, supra. For discussion of the appliV. U.S., 270 U.S. 349 (1926); Clark and Moore, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 411-14 (1935), the latter pointing out that review could also be secured by obtaining
rulings on propositions of law presented to the court and by motion for judgment. Cf. Simkins, op. cit. supra note 84, at 84-86.
89 28 U.S.C.A. § 773 (1928), as amended May 29, 1930, c. 357, 46 Stat. 486 (1930), 28

cable rules, see Fleischmann Co.

U.S.C.A. § 773 (1936), note 32 supra;for Rule 68 of the Preliminary Draft, see note 4 supra.
90 For the cases, see extensive annotations to 28 U.S.C.A. § 877 (1928), particularly notes
26-34. For reversals for erroneous conclusions, see French v. Edwards, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 147
(1874); McLaughlin v. Pacific Lumber Co., 293 U.S. 351 (1934) (on motion for judgment);
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F. (2d) 55 (C.C.A. 8th 1933). For the
general rule, see Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 125 (1869); Roogher v. Ins. Co., IO3 U.S.
90, 97 (i88o); Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U.S. 71, 78 (i893); Behn v. Campbell, 205 U.S. 403
(1907); Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 227 U.S. 434,444 (1913); Churchill v. Buck, 102
Fed. 38, 43-44 (C.C.A. 8th i9oo); Anglo-American Land, Mortgage and Agency Co. v. Lombard, 132 Fed. 721 (C.C.A. 8th 19o4), cert. den. i96 U.S. 638 (i9o4); Huglin v. H. M. Byllesby
& Co., 72 F. (2d) 341 (C.C.A. 8th 1934). The case of Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman,
295 U.S. 654 (i935), so much discussed as to the power of the appellate court to direct a judgment of dismissal on the merits instead of a new trial, is instructive here. In Redman v. Baltimore & Carolina Line, 7o F. (2d) 635 (C.C.A. 2d 1934), with Manton, Cir. J., dissenting, the
testimony in an action of negligence was widely divergent; but the court ruled it insufficient
to support the verdict and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court denied a petition for
certiorariby the plaintiff challenging the ruling on the insufficiency of the evidence (293 U.S.
577 (1934)), but granted it to review the issue whether a new trial or a dismissal on the merits
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rule of review into the statutes governing the newly created administrative tribunals. Witness the amendment to the Radio Act, which provides,
with regard to review of orders of the Federal Radio Commission, "that
the review by the court shall be limited to questions of law and that findings of fact by the commission, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the findings of the
commission are arbitrary or capricious."9' Contrast this rule with that
stated for equity review, "that the court will not disturb the findings
below unless they are clearly erroneous or manifestly against the weight
of the evidence. ' ' 92 And it may be suggested that the gap between the
two rules seems not overlarge, and that the law review may permit of
a rule sufficiently extensive to do all that justice requires without inviting
93
appeals on unwieldy records.
Another factor is the development of a vast number of administrative
tribunals within the government and the crystallization of a form of review of the finding of such tribunals. Such tribunals include the Interstate Commerce Commission, 94 the Federal Trade Commission, 95 the
should be ordered

(293

U.S.

541 (1934)),

and eventually directed the judgment of the circuit

court of appeals to be modified by substituting a direction for a judgment of dismissal on the
merits in place of the direction for a new trial, and, as so modified, to be affirmed, thereby
supporting a review of a case certainly on the border line between the weight and the sufficiency
of the evidence.
9146 Stat. 844, c. 788 (1930), 47 U.S.C.A. § 96 (1936), now repealed in 47 U.S.C.A. § 4o2e
(1936), note 98, infra; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. B. & M. Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933).
9Brown's

Guide to Federal and Bankruptcy Practice Sog (1933); cf., 30 Il1. L. Rev. 535

(1936), cited note 62 supra.
93There seems to be no hard and fast distinction between questions of law and questions
of fact; on debatable points the issue seems largely one of degree; and since there are so many
cases on the border line between ultimate facts and conclusions of facts, i.e., law, the way is
open to a court with understanding to accomplish substantial justice, whatever the formula.
See discussion in Clark, op. cit. supranote 41, at i5o-6o; Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading
under the Codes, 21 Col. L. Rev. 416 (1921); Cook, 'Facts' and 'Statements of Fact,' post p.
233; Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Col. L. Rev. i (1922); and cf. U.S. v. Wells, 283 U.S.
102 (1931), on ultimate facts. The Connecticut court, which reviews only errors of law, includes
conclusions of facts in that category. Dexter Yarn Co. v. American Fabric Co., 102 Conn. 529,
129 Atl. 527 (1925). Messrs. Arnold and James (Cases and Materials on Trials, judgments,
and Appeals 833-34, n. 50 (1936)), point out that "the elasticity of these two escapes" of review of an error of law or of an arbitrary finding without evidence to support it, as is reserved
by Brandeis, J., concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936), "is
sufficient to give the Court almost complete power to review if it wants to take it."
94See provisions in 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 (1928) ("The findings of the Commission or board as
to the facts, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive").
9s See provisions in zS U.S.C.A. § 45 (1928).
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Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 the National Labor Relations
Board, 97 the Federal Communications Commission, formerly the Radio
Commission, 9s as well as functions of executive officers such as the Secretary of Agriculture 99 They are set up for the purpose of dealing with a
specified class of cases, and are composed of men who are assumed to have
particular skill and knowledge in the fields in which they act. They are
to hear and examine witnesses and reports, which are of a technical and
particularized nature, and report their findings of fact as based on such
examination.
These findings of facts and the report thereon are subject to judicial
review, and it is instructive to consider the trend of the decisions on review in these cases. These findings of commissions and boards are returned to the reviewing court, with the report of the commission and the
evidence upon which the findings are made.oD The testimony and evidence in these cases is voluminous and often of a technical character,
which would render it exceedingly difficult to review de novo. On the other
hand, the matter in controversy in these cases is often of profound governmental and political significance, especially in those cases where the
commission is itself the party complaining in investigation of an infringement of a statute. These problems have made the matter of review of
these cases an exceedingly delicate task, particularly in the rate cases.
In approaching this problem the courts were possessed of the analogy
presented by these cases to those where a special master was appointed
by the court to hear and pass upon testimony and evidence and to report
96 See Act of June 6, '934, § 25(a), c. 404, 48 Stat. 88i, 9oi-2 ("The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." But the
Court may order the Commission to hear additional material evidence which had not been
brought forth before for reasonable grounds).

97 See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 16oe, i6of (x936) (similar to note 94 suPra, substituting "evidence"
for "testimony").
9847 U.S.C.A. § 96 (1936), cited in note 91 supra, was repealed by the Communications
Act of 1934 (June ig, 1934, c. 652, § 609, 48 Stat. 11o, 47 U.S.C.A. § 602 (1936), and the
power formerly possessed by the Radio Commission to regulate radio matters was given to
the Federal Communications Commission. 47 U.S.C.A. § 3o elseq. (1936). The provisions
limiting review which were in the Radio Act, cited in the text at note 91 s pra, are repeated
as to the Federal Communications Commission by 47 U.S.C.A. § 402e (1936).
99St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 38 (1936), commented on in 5o Harv. L.
Rev. 78 (1936); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. U.S., 280 U.S. 420 (1930); Acker v. U.S., 56 Sup.
Ct. 824 (1936).
100 Where findings are not made, the court will not search the record to ascertain the basis
of the decision, but will remand the case for the drafting of findings. See Public Service Comm.
v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 289 U.S. 67, 70, 71 (i933); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. U.S.,
295 U.S. 193, 201-2 (1935); but see U.S. v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 465 (I935). As to
the necessity of findings by the President "as to the existence of the required basis of his
action," see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431 (1935).
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his findings thereon. In those cases the report of the master was to be
treated as presumptively correct, but was to be subject to review by the
court, and the court might adopt the same, or modify or reject it in whole
or in part, when the court was satisfied fully that error had been committed.Io0 In the case of findings of commissions, however, the court was
presented with findings of fact by a board of experts in such matters, and
the recent decisions in the Supreme Court have pointed out again and
again that it is not the province of the court on review to substitute its
judgment for that of the commissionI °0 and that the findings of the commission, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive.03 Thus the findings of a commission are coming more and more to be regarded in the
same light as the verdict of a jury of experts, and not as a mere advisory
opinion to the court. In recent acts it is stated expressly as a part of the
legislation.104
See Federal Equity Rule 61j promulgated May 31, 1932, 28 U.S.C.A. following § 723,

1x0

at p. 3 (1936).

x- See Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397, 407 (1932), and Florida v. U.S., 292 U.S. i, 12 (I934);
cf. cases in note 9g supra, also in notes io3, 104, io6, io8, infra.
103 The cases are very numerous. The following citations, in addition to those given elsewhere in this article, are only illustrative: Federal Trade Comm. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291
U.S. 67, 73 (1934); Federal Trade Comm. v. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304,.314 (1934); Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Penn. Ry., 56 Sup. Ct. 546 (1936); B. & 0. R. R. v. U.S., 56 Sup. Ct.
797 (i936); Goss v. Federal Radio Comm., 67 F. (2d) 507, 5o8 (App. D. C. 1933); Federal
Trade Comm. v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 8z F. (2d) 362 (C.C.A. 3d 1935); Cf. G. C. Henderson,
The Federal Trade Commission, c. IM, also pp. 336-37 (1924).
A report of the Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association, in
advocating the establishment of a court of administrative justice, urges as a function of such
court the review of administrative findings and makes objection to the present rule, which it
regards as well settled. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, Advance
Program, 59th Annual Meeting 1936, 209, 213, 219. And see also McGuire, Proposed Reforms
in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, i9 A.B.A.J. 471 (1933). But see the excellent article, R. M. Cooper, The Proposed U.S. Administrative Court, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 193,
248-49 (1936), referring to the constitutional problem stated below. See note io5 infra.
The much controverted question raised by Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), that the
Supreme Court must review "constitutional facts," that is, must review the findings to the
extent to see that constitutional rights are not violated, while it may in practice greatly affect
the scope of review, yet, however it may eventually be settled, it does not controvert the
theory; for the issue of constitutionality is necessarily a legal one and the real debate is as to
how inclusive that issue shall be made. Cf. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of
Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 8o U. of Pa. L. Rev.
1055 (1932); 41 Yale L. J. 1037 (1932); 21 Calif. L. Rev. 266 (I933); and 5o Harv. L. Rev. 78
(1936), on St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 38 (i936), cited note 99 supra.
04 "The findings of the board as to the facts are made conclusive by section Io(c), 29 U.S.
C.A. § 16o(c) (i936)." National Labor Relations Board v. Associated Press, 85 F. (2d) 56
(C.C.A. 2d 1936), citing Federal Trade Comm. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (i934);
Florida v. U.S., 292 U.S. i (1934); and Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123 (I935); cf. note 91

.supra.
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The rulings of the court with reference to the Radio Act in this connection are instructive. Before the amendment referred to above, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals was directed to review the evidence and revise the decision appealed from and enter such judgment as
to it might seem just. This provision made the court a superior and revising agency in the administrative field, and consequently its decision was
not a judicial judgment reviewable by the Supreme Court. 05 But the
amendment was held, however, in the Nelson case to be sharply in contrast with the previous grant of authority: "The limitation manifestly
demands judicial, as distinguished from administrative, review." And
hence this being a judicial review it was within the function of the court
to consider it. °6 Although the point is not now open, in view of the history of the chancery courts, it would seem that the equity review in like
measure is an administrative one, as compared to the law review which
is a judicial one. The equity review treats the trial judge with no more
favor than were administrative experts under some, at least, of the earlier
acts, now definitely being superseded.
The distinction in form of review becomes more troublesome where a
choice of method is open to the parties. Thus, as we have seen, the district court has concurrent jurisdiction under the Tucker Act with the
court of claims as to claims against the government not exceeding $io,ooo.
As matters now stand, the review from either tribunal is the same and is
limited.10 7 With the proposed Rule 68, unless a special exception is to
be made, an exception not yet suggested, the review of cases coming from
the two tribunals will be quite different. A similar situation will occur
as to claims for tax refunds made either in a district court or directly
from the board of tax appeals to the circuit court of appeals108 If the
former is to be subjected to full review while the latter remains as at
present, there is incentive to jockeying for position in these cases, and
"oS
Federal Radio Comm. v. Virginia Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); cf. Harvey v. United
States, io5 U.S. 671, 691 (i88i) ("equity jurisdiction conferred in a special case by a special
act"). See Cooper, loc. cit. supranote xo3; W. G. Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 894 (1930); 29 Mich. L. Rev. 766 (1931).
-06Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. B. & k. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (i933).
X07 See notes 56 and 57 supra. For review in bankruptcy see In re 620 Church St. Bldg.
Corp., 57 Sup. Ct. 88 (1936), and Brown, op. cit. supra note 55, at 526; for review on certain
anomalous and miscellaneous appeals see Brown, id., at 5oi, 502.
108 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 617f, 641, 64ic (1935), 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2o) (1926); Helvering v. Rankin,
295 U.S. 123 (i935); Comm. of Internal Revenue v. Field, 67 F. (2d) 876 (C.C.A. 2d 1933);
Comm. of Internal Revenue v. Newbury, 8o F. (2d) 631 (C.C.A. 7th 1935); Comm. of Internal
Revenue v. H. F. Neighbor's Realty Co., 81 F. (2d) 173 (C.C.A. 6th 1936); Beech v. Comm.
of Internal Revenue, 82 F. (2d) 42 (C.C.A. 3d 1936).
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the development of clear cut and certain rules of substantive law, upon

which business men may rely, is impeded"' 9
A third factor to be considered is the attitude of the state courts. Here
there is the greatest variation. A substantial number of jurisdictions have
extended the equity review substantially as provided in Rule 68. 11° Perhaps a still larger group give lip service to the old line of demarcation, but
construe away its force by extensive application of the presumption in
favor of the trial court's finding."" The state codes, too, reflect the difficulties occasioned by the divided procedure on appeal requiring resort
to historical distinctions for the purpose of appeal, if for no other.112 Some
eight or nine states have, however, completely assimilated the review of
equity cases in that of the law."X3 In these states the difficulty as to the
separate rules is done away with, and all cases are treated alike. It does
su pra note 5, present somewhat diverse
09Judge Chesnut and Professor Blume, op. cit.
views as to the effect of these various reviews in accelerating or reducing waiver of jury trial
by the parties. Perhaps conclusive evidence cannot be afforded on this question, but statistics
from one of the states applying the law review to all cases-Connecticut-shows an unusually
large waiver of jury cases in all kinds of actions, negligence, contract, or what not, and demonstrates, at least for that jurisdiction, that unitary review has certainly had no deleterious
results in this regard. See Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial
Administration, 43 Yale L. J. 867 (1934). It is doubtful if the parties at the time waiver is had
and before trial are then anxious to look forward to extensive appeal or are then greatly influenced by the possibility of extending the appeal.
110See note to Rule 68, Preliminary Draft, p. 18, listing, with citations, the following sixteen
jurisdictions: Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin; with, however, possible doubt as to California and Washington.
- Cf., for example, Adams v. Silverman, 280 Mass. 23, 182 N.E. i (i932) (findings of fact
made by the trial judge after hearing oral testimony cannot be reversed on appeal, "unless
they appear to be plainly wrong"); and Barry v. Merrill, 85 N.H. 525, x6i Atl. 34 (1932). The
states included are those not listed in notes iio supraand 113 infra.
1- See, e.g., Sherwood v. Sherwood, 44 Iowa 192 (,876); Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co.,
22o N. Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (I917); Carroll v. Bullock, 207 N. Y. 567, ioi N.E. 438 (1913);
Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N. Y. i (i884); Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, ioo Pac. 397
(1909); and cf. also Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 26o U.S. 35 (1922); Joyce v. Humbird, 78 F. (2d) 386 (C.C.A. 7 th 1935), commented on in 3o Ill. L. Rev. 535 (1936).
113 See Arizona, Franklin v. Havalena Mining Co., x8 Ariz. 201, 216-17, 157 Pac. 986 (1916)
(interpreting the effect to be given to § 38i9 of the Revised Code); Connecticut, Meriden Trust
and Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller, 88 Conn. 157, go Atl.228 (1914); Idaho, § 11-219 Code (1932),
see also Lisenby v. Inter-Mountain State Bank, 33 Idaho oi, i9o Pac. 355 (1920); Kansas,
Laycock v. Study, 141 Kan. 756, 761, 44 P. (2d) 220 (i935); Kentucky, § 331 (2), Carroll's Code
of Civ. Practice; Nevada, c. 90, § r5 Stat. (1935), in the light of the older case State of Nevada
v. Yellow Jacket Silver Mining Co., 5 Nev. 415, 418 (i868); New Mexico, §§ 105-2520, 105813 Stat. (1929), Fraser v. State Savings Bank, i8N.M. 340, 137 Pac. 592 (1912); Norl Carolina, art. IV, § 13 of the constitution; Pennsylvania, § 1165 Purdon's Stat. tit. 12 (1931),
Brinton v. Davidson, 308 Pa. 371, 373, 162 Atl. 905 (1932), Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. Klein,
315 Pa. 156, 173 AtL 188 (1934).
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not appear that appeals are not fairly decided, but, if one can judge by
reading the reported cases, there seems to be a real gain in simplicity
of procedure.
In this connection the English procedure should be noted. While it
has afforded us many fine examples of procedural reform,1 4 it presents in
the matter of review a different situation from that which we face in this
country. The high cost of appeals in that country serves as a sufficient
deterrent to promiscuous appeals. The fact that the presence or absence
of a jury trial in that country is a matter of discretion with the court, and
not a mandate of the constitution, places a different emphasis upon the
review of findings. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Rules of the
High Court of judicature in England announce that all appeals to the
Court of Appeal shall be by way of a rehearing," s the English courts have
accorded a high presumption of correctness to findings of facts in the trial
court."x6

It should be seen, too, that the English concept of a rehearing of the
case is designed to secure affirmation unless there is real error, not wider
review and more extensive control over the action of the trial court. In
other words, the English idea of review is not facilitated by the equity
review; it is approximated, perhaps to the extent permissible under our
constitutional protection of jury trials, by the federal statutes, reiterated
in the proposed rules, against reversals except for material error affecting
7
the substantial rights of the parties."
V
Here, then, is the background against which the choice of the proper
rule of review must be made.
Continuance of the old division as fixed essentially by historical accident, to wit, the place where chancery jurisdiction finally became settled,
is definitely undesirable as requiring the upper court to make distinctions
which it is the main purpose of the new reform to avoid.
114 For example, the new Proposed Rules of Procedure in District Courts have borrowed
in many particulars from the English practice.
XSOrder LVIII, rule i of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Annual Practice
1935, at 1235, provides that all appeals to the Court of Appeal shall be by way of a rehearing.
X16For example, Lord Halsbury in the case of Montgomerie & Co. v. Wallace-James, [19o4]
A.C. 73, 75, states: "Where a question of fact has been decided by a tribunal which has seen
and heard the witnesses, the greatest weight ought to be attached to the finding of such a
tribunal. It has had the opportunity of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and judging
of their veracity and accuracy in a way that no appellate tribunal can have." To the same
effect see the opinion of Lindley, L. J., in the case of Coghlan v. Cumberland, [1898] 1 Ch. 704,
705, and of Lord Dunedin in Cooper v. General Accident, etc., Corp., [1922] 2 Ir. R. 214.
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U.S.C.A. §§ 391, 777

(1928),

Rules 50, 70, Preliminary Draft, loc. cit. supra note i.
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Extension of the equity review to jury-waived cases as suggested in
Rule 68 has a definite appeal to those who feel that at least a second
review by an upper tribunal of more than a single judge is necessary for
the proper control of the trial court's action. It cannot be extended to
jury trials because of the express provisions of the Seventh Amendment.
It does afford a fairly flexible system not bound by definite rule, with
potentially at least very extensive power in the appellate court.
Nevertheless, our history would seem to indicate considerable insistence on the view that the right of appeal should be restricted. This is
based in part on the protection from a plethora of cases of our important
federal appellate courts, notably the Supreme Court of the United States,
through a reduction in both the number of appeals and the records in
those cases where appeals are allowed. It is also based upon the feeling
that the trial judge's reaction to the witnesses is on the whole more dependable than those to be obtained only from the printed record, a feeling
which has resulted in a restriction of the equity review in practice.
An extension of review at the present time would appear out of keeping
with this history. It would also present definite problems of conflicts as
to other important federal cases, notably claims against the United
States, claims for tax refunds, and appeals from administrative tribunals.
It would continue a divided practice on appeal and prevent the simplicity
and uniformity of one single concrete rule. On the whole, therefore, having in mind the advantages of simplicity and uniformity, of 'compatibility
with other federal jurisdiction, of reducing appeals and complex records,
of giving due weight to the findings of the judge who actually hears the
witnesses, and of limiting reversals except on substantial grounds while
nevertheless affording ample power to correct where necessary, there
would seem a substantial basis for argument in support of extending the
law review, perhaps stated in the very words of the amendment to the
Radio Act quoted above, to all cases alike.

